Below, you will find a sample of maps and charts that I have designed during the past few months.
The map below, which shows Chinese presence in Middle Eastern ports, was designed for a research paper I wrote in the Spring of 2023. I compiled the data from a variety of sources that helped me triangulate, enhancing the validity of my findings. Some of the most relevant sources I used are company websites, open-source information about investments and MoUs, and academic and policy pieces written by Isaac B. Kardon and Grant Rhode, among others.
This chart shows, in a dynamic format, the evolution of Saudi exports between 2011 and 2021. Notice the gradual decline of the US and the growing preponderance of Asian customers. You can filter by region, in case you hadn’t noticed!
Made with Flourish
I designed the map below as a visual support for a paper I wrote in the Spring of 2023, where I examined India - Middle East relations from a ports/maritime perspective. There are two major players that deserve a closer look: the UAE’s DP World and India’s Adani Ports. Over 30% of the goods coming in and out of India go through DP World-operated terminals, an insanely huge amount! In the next few years, we might see other GCC-based port operators such as the UAE’s AD Ports Group, Qatar’s QTerminals, or Saudi Arabia’s RSGT invest in more ports across South Asia.
The map below shows a crescent or axis that extends from the port of Dekheila to the west all the way to Sokhna, in the southern entrance of the Suez Canal. I designed this map to visually support my argument in a paper I wrote in the Spring of 2023, where I traced Chinese investment and interest in Middle Eastern ports. This axis matters because Chinese companies currently have operations in four of these ports and will soon be operating a terminal in Sokhna, the fifth one. This will grant Chinese port operators a strategic location in both entrances of the Suez Canal from where they could potentially engage in surveillance activities. It will also give significant leverage to these Chinese companies over the most populated Arab country, as they will be overseeing a lot of what comes in and out of the country.
This is a bar chart race I designed during my time as a Research Associate at the Gulf International Forum, showing the evolution of the GCC’s largest sovereign wealth funds throughout the past decade. Notice the tremendous growth of Saudi Arabia’s PIF, and the dominance of Emirati sovereign wealth funds when considered in aggregate. These funds are a key instrument to transition to a post-oil economy, although they may have different ways of trying to get there. Some, like the PIF, are focused on investing domestically across a variety of sectors. Others, like Mubadala, focus on tech, energy and renewables, trying to bring relevant expertise into the UAE. And others, like the KIA and ADIA, focus on long-term value creation and generating savings for the prosperity of future generations.
The graph below displays the evolution in military expenditures in the Gulf region throughout three decades, from 1990 to 2022. When it comes to military expenditure, Saudi Arabia is clearly in its own league, ahead of all its neighbors. In recent years, Iran has been spending only a fraction (less than 10%) of what Riyadh is spending. See this piece in Bourse & Bazaar for more context.
The chart below shows the evolution of the GDP for each country in the Gulf region from 1998 to 2022. Notice the effect of sanctions on Iran’s GDP growth, and the ebbs and flows of GDP growth that result from fluctuations in global oil prices.
The map below shows the cooperation agreements between LOGINK, a unified digital logistics and trade platform administered by China’s Ministry of Transport, and various European ports. This map is part of an article I wrote for the Center of Maritime Strategy, which ranked among the Center’s most read/popular content in 2023!
This map shows the location of shipbuilding companies, shipyards, and docks in the UAE. Unlike most other countries in the Arabian Peninsula, the UAE has developed a unique domestic shipbuilding capacity, led by Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding and Al Fattan, among others.
This map shows the location of maritime and naval academies in the UAE, most of which are concentrated in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Thanks to the centrality of port operations and shipping in the UAE’s economy, the country now hosts a significant amount of entities offering maritime-related training.
The map below shows Saudi, Emirati, and Chinese presence in Red Sea ports. I designed this map for a research paper I wrote in the fall of 2022, using a variety of sources including company websites, news media, and other reports.
I designed the two charts below for a research paper I wrote in the spring of 2023, looking at the importance of the Middle East region for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In that paper, I argued that taking the Middle East as a bloc may not be the best approach; instead, we should focus on specific countries and even port cities which play a significant role in the BRI. Here’s an excerpt from the paper:
Certain countries possess a combination of a strategic geographical location, well-developed logistics and trade facilities (ports and free zones), large consumer markets, and availability of hydrocarbons, which determine the relative importance each individual state has in the BRI’s grand scheme.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are the top priorities; Iraq, Iran, Qatar, Turkey, Israel, Oman, Algeria, and Kuwait are important due to their role as energy suppliers and/or because of their large consumer markets; and most of the Maghreb countries, Libya, most states in the Levant, Yemen, and Bahrain, are a lot less relevant to the BRI’s success. These are less attractive due to their not-so-strategic geographical location, lack of major transshipment and deep-water ports, and/or relatively smaller and harder to access consumer markets.
Chinese Trade Volume with Selected Partners, in billion USD (2019).
Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity.
Value of China’s Overseas Investment and Construction (2013-2022).
Source: AEI China Global Investment Tracker.
The map below shows the military facilities of the Royal Saudi Armed Forces near the Red Sea. This map is part of Chapter 3 of my master’s thesis, where I argued that Saudi Arabia retains a higher capacity than the UAE to apply force when and where needed in the Red Sea, as it has significantly more available military capabilities, and sits geographically closer to the Red Sea. All the information is open source, from a map that no longer loads on Sinews of War and Trade, and two other sites called WhoWasInCommand and Scramble-Dutch Aviation Society-Orders of Battle.